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The relationship between intervention and representation is currently resurfacing 
in philosophy of science. Analytical treatments of the specific intersections between 
representation and intervention have recently been explored in Hacking (1983), Radder 
(2003), Heidelberger (2003), van Fraassen (2008), and Keyser (2017). These accounts 
analyze intervention-based experimental and measurement practice and the consequences 
for representing and model-building. Of particular interest in my discussion is that some 
of these accounts explicitly differentiate between representational and productive roles in 
scientific practice. For example, Heidelberger (2003) and van Fraassen (2008) discuss the 
representational and productive roles of instruments in experiment and measurement. In 
the former role, relations in a natural phenomenon are represented in an instrument (van 
Fraassen 2008, 94). In the latter role, instruments create new phenomena or mimetic 
phenomena, which resemble natural phenomena. Keyser (2017) takes the distinction 
between representation and production a step further to differentiate two types of 
experimental/measurement methodologies:  
When scientists measure/experiment they can take measurements, in which 
case the primary aim is to represent natural phenomena. Scientists can 
also make measurements, in which case the aim is to intervene in order 
to produce experimental objects and processes—characterized as ‘effects’. 
(Keyser 2017, 2) 
On Keyser’s account ‘taking a measurement’ involves a scientist using a result in the 
context of theory to represent a given phenomenon (2017, 9-15). In contrast, ‘making a 
measurement’ involves setting up experimental conditions to produce a phenomenon—
where that phenomenon can be realized in nature but it can also be a brand new 
phenomenon (Keyser 2017, 10). The difference between these two methodologies 
seems to be a matter of passive representation of a phenomenon vs. active intervention 
to produce a phenomenon. While the distinction between representation and 
intervention has been useful in classifying methodology in well-documented contexts 
like thermometry, microscopy, and cellular measurement, I argue that it falls apart in 
contexts where taking and making are entangled—such as in the context of biomarker 
measurement in the biomedical sciences.  
In this discussion, I aim to show that in complex methodological contexts, 
representational and intervention-based roles require re-conceptualization. I analyze the 
relations between representation and intervention by focusing on the role of 
intervention in mediating representations. In Section 2, I show how applied scientific 
practice challenges the simple distinction between representational and intervention-
based roles of experiment/measurement. In Section 3, I discuss the complex interaction 
between representation and intervention applied to methodology in biomarker 
measurement.  
 
2. Methodology at the Intersection between Intervention and Representation 
In order to understand why the distinction between representation and 
intervention needs a multifaceted approach, it is important to be explicit about what it 
means to represent and intervene in scientific practice. In Section 2.1, I draw on van 
Fraassen (2008) to discuss representation and both van Fraassen (2008) and Keyser 
(2017) to discuss intervention. Then in Section 2.2, I show how applied scientific practice 
challenges the simplistic distinction between representational and intervention-based 
roles of experiment/measurement. I argue that the distinction between intervention and 
representation is less about specific types of methodologies in measurement/experiment 
and more about where one philosophically partitions the measurement process. 
 
2.1. Representation and intervention 
In experimental and measurement practice, representation has at least three 
important components: First, instruments or experimental contexts yield measurement 
values; Second, those values can only be interpreted within the context of a well-
developed theory; and third, the relation between the measurement values and the 
phenomenon is determined by a user (e.g., experimenter). Van Fraassen (2008) provides 
a rich characterization of representation in measurement and experiment, which requires 
careful analysis. Worth noting is that van Fraassen takes measurements to be a “special 
elements of the experimental procedure” (2008, 93-94). For my discussion the 
embeddedness of measurement in experiment is not important. I will focus on the roles 
or processes within measurement and experimental practice. But to do this, I will 
sometimes refer to ‘measurement’ and other times to ‘experiment’. Van Fraassen’s 
characterization focuses on interaction and representation in measurement: 
A measurement is a physical interaction, set up by agents, in a way that allows 
them to gather information. The outcome of a measurement provides a 
representation of the entity (object, event, process) measured, selectively, by 
displaying values of some physical parameters that—according to the theory 
governing this context—characterize that object. (2008, 179-180) 
For van Fraassen, measurement interaction between an object of measurement and 
apparatus generates a physical outcome—the “measurement outcome” or “physical 
correlate of the measurement outcome”—, which provides information content about the 
target of measurement (2008, 143). The contents of measurement outcomes convey 
information about what is measured through the mediation of theory. Van Fraassen posits 
that theoretical characterization of measurement interaction requires ‘coherence’: 
The theoretical characterization of the measurement situations is required to be 
coherent with the claims about the existence of measurement outcomes, their 
relation to what is measured, and their function as sources of information. (2008, 
145)  
In short, the theory tells a coherence story about “how its outcomes provide 
information about what is being measured” (145). Furthermore, the information content 
is representational. Van Fraassen says, “The outcome provides a representation of the 
measured item, but also represents it as thus or so” (2008, 180). To understand how the 
representational relation works, it is important to refer to van Fraassen’s ‘representation 
criterion’:  
The criterion for what sorts of interactions can be measurements will be, roughly 
speaking, that the outcome must represent the target in a certain fashion—, 
selectively resembling it at a certain level of abstraction, according to the theory—
it is a representation criterion. (van Fraassen 2008, 141).  
Two aspects of the representation criterion require explanation: First, the 
distinction between “target” and “outcome”; and second, the role of theory in the 
operation of measurement. I begin with the former. Van Fraassen makes a technical 
distinction between the target of measurement (‘phenomena’) and the outcome of 
measurement (‘appearances’): 
Phenomena are observable, but their appearance, that is to say, what they look like 
in given measurement or observation set-ups, is to be distinguished from them as 
much as any person’s appearance is to be distinguished from that person. (2008, 
285)  
For van Fraassen, phenomena are observable objects, events, and processes (2008, 283). 
He emphasizes that phenomena include all observable entities—whether observed or not 
(2008, 307). A given phenomenon can be measured in many different ways. The outcome 
of each measurement provides a perspective on a given phenomenon—meaning that the 
content of measurement tells us what things look like, not what they are like (2008, 176, 
182). The content of the measurement outcome is an appearance.  
An important qualification is that for van Fraassen, a representation does not 
represent on its own. The scientist selects the aspects/respects and degrees to which a 
representation represents a target. This relation can be expressed as: Z uses X to represent 
Y as F, for purposes P.  
Now that the target and outcome of measurement have been characterized, we can 
specify van Fraassen’s role of theory in measurement. According to van Fraassen, 
“Measurement is an operation that locates an item (already classified as in the domain of 
a given theory) in a logical space, provided by the theory to represent a range of possible 
states or characteristics of such items (164). Three things are worth noting about van 
Fraassen’s discussion of logical spaces. First, a logical space provides a multidimensional 
mathematical space that locates potential objects of measurement (2008, 164). By 
measuring we assign the item a location in a logical space. However, according to van 
Fraassen, it does not have to be on a real number continuum. As van Fraassen points out, 
items may be classified (by theory) on a range that is “an algebra”, “lattice”, or a 
“rudimentary poset” (2008, 172). Second, theoretical location depends on a “family of 
models” and not just an individual model (2008, 164). Third, an item is located in a 
“region” of logical space rather than at an exact point (2008, 165). Simply put, theory 
provides a classificatory system for what is measured. Importantly, theory is necessary 
for this type of classification. Van Fraassen says, “A claim of the form “This is an X-
measurement of quantity M pertaining to S” makes sense only in a context where the 
object measured is already classified as a system characterized by quantity M” (2008, 144 
my emphasis).  
We can summarize the above discussion into four conditions for van Fraassen’s 
account of representation in measurement/experiment practice: 
 
i. Physical Interaction Condition: The interaction between apparatus an object 
produces a physical correlate of the measurement outcome. 
 
ii. Theoretical Characterization Condition: The content of the measurement outcome 
is given a location in a logical space, which is governed by a family of theoretical 
models. An item’s location within a logical space can change in content and truth 
conditions as accepted theories change.  
 
iii. Representational Content Condition: The content of a measurement outcome 
provides a selective representation of a given target of measurement (phenomenon). 
Because representations do not represent on their own, users and pragmatic 
considerations set the representational relation such that: Z uses X to represent Y as 
F, for purposes P. 
 
iv. Perspectival Information Condition: Measurement generates appearances, which 
are public, intersubjective, contents of measurement outcomes. Appearances provide 
selective information about phenomena. Thus information from measurement tells us 
what something looks like and not what something is like.  
 
Van Fraassen notes that measurement and experiment are not only limited to a 
representational role, they can take on at least two productive roles. First, instruments 
can produce phenomena that “imitate” natural phenomena. That is, carefully controlled 
conditions give rise to mimetic effects that are used by scientists in the context of 
theory to resemble natural phenomena (2008, 94-95). It is important to note that van 
Fraassen emphasizes that natural phenomena are phenomena that exist independent of 
human intervention (2008, 95). The second productive role of instruments is that they 
are used as “engines of creation” to produce or manufacture new phenomena. Van 
Fraassen is not explicit about whether or not the representational roles can smear with 
the productive roles. There is no reason to assume that these roles cannot be combined; 
but that requires explicit philosophical work to see how, which I develop in Section 3. 
Keyser (2017) is explicit about the relationship between the representational and 
intervention-based roles in science. He discusses the use of intervention for developing 
causal representations. Scientists intervene, thereby manipulating causal conditions 
within a given measurement or experimental system, which he calls ‘intervention 
systems’, to produce some sort of “effect” (Keyser 2017, 9-10). According to Keyser, 
“Intervention systems consist of organized experimental conditions and as such the 
effects that emerge are often sensitive to changes in conditions” (Keyser 2017, 10). 
Once a given effect is produced it can be used in order to be informative about causal 
relations for theoretical model building.  
Keyser (2017) also differentiates between the methodologies of taking 
measurements vs. making measurements. I interpret that taking measurements involves 
three components: First, some instrument or experimental arrangement yields a 
qualitative or quantitative value; second, a ‘theoretical representational framework’—
which is just a body of models—is necessary in order to characterize that value 
according to parameters and relations between parameters; and third, a scientist sets up 
the resemblance relation between the measurement/experiment value and some 
aspect(s) of a phenomenon (Keyser 2017, 14-15). In contrast, when scientists make 
measurements they manipulate causal conditions—such as, preparatory, instrument, and 
background conditions—within an intervention system. This manipulation gives rise to 
some effect (Keyser 2017, 3-12).  
There is something puzzling about Keyser’s distinction between making vs. 
taking, if we apply the aforementioned conditions (i-iv): i. Physical Interaction 
Condition; ii. Theoretical Characterization Condition; iii. Representational Content 
Condition; and iv. Perspectival Information Condition. Namely, it seems that ‘making 
measurements’ is compatible with conditions i-iv, so it is not clear why there is a need for 
a distinction in methodological type, but rather just a difference in details for each 
condition. For example, when a measurement is made, there is a (i) physical interaction 
that occurs, but it is broader than just the instrument and object. The interaction can 
include “experimental conditions” (Keyser 2017, 3-5). The product of a made 
measurement is also amenable to (ii) theoretical characterization. Keyser emphasizes 
that theoretical characterization is necessary for experiment/measurement (Keyser 2017, 
14); but he does not make the additional move to say that theoretical characterization is 
part of the process of making a measurement. That is, in order to make a measurement 
about an effect, one needs to also characterize that effect. Without the final 
characterization, one is only dealing with the material conditions, which is an incomplete 
part of the measurement process. Keyser can accept that theoretical characterization is a 
necessary component of making a measurement. Otherwise, he risks offering a limited 
concept of ‘making a measurement’ that only applies to arranging the material 
components of the measurement process and nothing further.  
The same challenge goes for (iii) representational content and (iv) perspectival 
information. An important component of the measurement process is to represent the 
relation between the produced effect and some aspect(s) of a phenomenon. For example, 
is this given effect a limited mimetic representation of a natural phenomenon or is it a 
brand new phenomenon? Without claims about what the effect is and its relation to 
objects, events, and processes in the world, ‘making a measurement’ is uninformative 
about part of the measurement process: the final value of the measurement outcome.  
The aforementioned considerations question the need for a distinction between 
‘making’ vs. ‘taking’. One conclusion is that making uses the same components (i-iv), 
just with slightly different detail. But the other conclusion is a bit unsatisfying: making is 
really only about organizing the material components, which is an initial step in the 
measurement process, and it does not apply to later steps in measurement.   
 
2.2. Dynamic relations between intervention and representation 
I argue that the distinction between intervention vs. representation is less about 
specific types of methodologies in measurement/experiment and more about where to 
philosophically partition the measurement process. To make this point clear, I make 
two sub-points: 1) Measurement in the biological sciences offers complex and sometimes 
blurred relations between instrument and object of measurement such that representation 
and production take on dynamic roles; 2) There is a difference between the act of 
measurement and the total process of measurement. I briefly describe (1) and (2).  
On van Fraassen’s (2008) and Keyser’s (2017) characterizations of representation 
in measurement, the role of the instrument/apparatus seems to have an important 
mediating function. It may be the case that philosophical focus on case studies (e.g., 
thermometry, microscopy, cellular bio, and bacteria) that are instrument-intensive 
provide a certain support for an instrument-centric account of representation in 
measurement. Whether or not the necessary mediating role of instruments is an explicit 
part of both accounts, there is room to develop a richer philosophical view of the role of 
representation in the total measurement process. Without such philosophical 
development, we risk missing complex cases of measurement where intervention occurs 
side-by-side with representation. For example, in some cases of biological measurement, 
scientists use the organism to measure processes in that same organism but also to 
represent larger phenomena (Prasolova et al. 2006). For example, mouse diets are 
manipulated in order to measure chromatin pattern changes. I characterize this as the 
mouse constituting experimental conditions that are being manipulated in order to 
measure some sort of process. The manipulation of conditions indicates an interventionist 
approach (or ‘making’ a measurement). Moreover, without manipulating the mouse’s diet 
scientists would not be able to make a reliable measurement on chromatin structure at all. 
So the organism is not only being manipulated as part of the experimental/measurement 
set-up, it is a crucial part of that set-up. That is, without intervention, there is no reliable 
result. In addition to the organism being used as part of the measurement set-up, it also 
serves as a physical representation of the dynamics of chromatin pattern change. That is, 
a given model organism can serve as a data model for a specific phenomenon of study—
e.g., chromatin pattern in organism X. So, in this case the organism serves a dual 
function: it constitutes a set of experimental conditions to be manipulated and it serves as 
a physical representation of a phenomenon. Because of the dual function, this seems to be 
a case of both ‘making’ and ‘taking’ a measurement.  
This brings me to sub-point (2). The total process of measurement is often 
complex in the biological sciences and requires multiple stages of intervening and 
representing. As mentioned in the model organism example representation and 
intervention are often entangled. Measurement is not merely putting an instrument up to 
something and waiting for a reading, which can be classified as an act of measurement. 
Measurement is also not merely creating effects out of material conditions. Measurement 
requires manipulation of conditions that is used in order to generate a representation. For 
example, identifying a mysterious fungus that is entangled with other fungus in a sample 
is an active process that requires both intervention and representation. One method is to 
take a sample and scrape it over a petri dish. What grows are spores that are passively 
deposited. But if common fungi were commingled with the mysterious fungi in the 
sample, and the common fungi grew faster, it would be impossible to identify the 
mysterious fungus. That is, coming back in a couple of weeks and seeing the petri dish 
covered with familiar species would lead to a false conclusion. Another way to perform 
the measurement (i.e. culture samples) is as follows. Take the samples and grind them up. 
Then sprinkle them into a petri dish. Put the dish under the microscope and, using a fine 
needle, pick out fragments of the mysterious fungus and transplant them to their own 
dishes (Scott 2010). Once the fragments have been transplanted through this fine-grained 
intervention, each dish can be left to grow the colonies. The final dishes will offer visual 
representations that serve as data on the nature of the mysterious fungus. Notice here that 
intervention is a precursor to reliable representation.  
Representation is not only reserved for the final instrument reading. It can also 
occur at other stages in the measurement process. Likewise, manipulation does not have 
to occur only at the earlier stages. For instance, organic matter can function as an 
instrument, like in the case of FourU thermometers, which are RNA molecules that act as 
thermometers in Salmonella (see Waldminghaus et al. 2007). Suppose that a scientist sets 
up an experiment to iteratively measure to what extent modifying RNA factors in FourU 
thermometers changes thermometer readings in Salmonella. In such a case the scientist 
could modify molecular factors and use the organic thermometers as temperature 
measures over many iterations, which would culminate in some sort of data model that 
organizes the relationship between molecular factors and FourU function. In such a case, 
there are multiple layers of intervention and representation.  
The complex layering of intervention and representation is apparent in biomarker 
measurement in the biomedical sciences, where biological components serve as 
representations of disease conditions, but are also intervened on in order to make more 
reliable representations. I turn to this case study in the subsequent section. 
  
3. Intervening in Representations and Representing Interventions 
Biomarkers are used in biomedical measurement to reliably predict causal 
information about patient outcomes while minimizing the complexity of measurement, 
resources, and invasiveness. A biomarker is an assayable metric—or simply, an 
indicator—that is used by scientists to draw conclusions about a biological process (De 
Gruttola et al. 2001). The greatest utility from biomarker measurement comes from their 
ability to help clinicians and researchers make conclusions with limited invasiveness. The 
reliance on biomarkers to make causal conclusions has prompted the use of ‘surrogate 
markers’. These biomarkers are used to substitute for a clinically meaningful endpoint 
such as a disease condition. A major scientific methodological issue is that the use of 
multiple biomarkers will produce disagreeing results—and this is true even in the context 
of biomarkers that use similar biological pathways. To make methodological matters 
worse, theoretical representation is often not equipped to fill in the causal detail for each 
biomarker measurement. This amounts to an unfolding methodological puzzle about how 
to use intervention and representation in biomarkers to produce reliable measurements. 
My interest in this case study is not in solving the methodological puzzle, but rather in 
showing the relations between intervention and representation in such a complex case 
study. In this section, I discuss the complexity of intervention and representation in 
biomarker measurement to illustrate how intervention mediates the measurement process.  
To understand the complex methodology in biomarker measurement it is 
important to detail the use and limitations of biomarkers. Some biomarkers are used as a 
substitute for some clinical endpoint. For instance, LDL cholesterol (LDL-C) is a 
biomarker that clinicians and physicians use to correspond to a clinical endpoint—e.g., 
heart attack. Moreover, the biomarker is associated with risk factors such as coronary 
artery stenosis, atherosclerosis, and angina pectoris. Katz (2004) argues that all 
biomarkers are candidates for ‘surrogate markers’, which can serve as substitutes for 
clinical endpoints. That is, surrogate markers are reliable biomarkers that have a one-to-
one correspondence with the disease condition such that they can be used to provide 
reliable predictive and causal information about a given clinical endpoint. There are a 
couple of points worth noting. First, notice that biomarkers and surrogate markers are 
being used as representations of a clinical endpoint. That is, to figure out the likelihood of 
developing a disease condition and to understand the risk factors associated with that 
disease condition, scientists use biomarkers that indicate information about the endpoint. 
This means that these physiological components can be used by clinicians and physicians 
to represent disease conditions to respects and degrees. The second point worth noting is 
that there are many biomarkers but limited surrogate markers and even more limited 
validated surrogate markers (‘surrogate endpoints’)—which are surrogate markers that 
are reliable in multiple contexts of interventions. The importance of this will be relevant 
shortly when I discuss the complexity of biomarker measurement. For our purposes, this 
means that most biomarkers in biomedical practice provide very limited representational 
information.  
Surrogate markers are not passively used as physical representations of disease 
conditions. Their use is often more effective for representational purposes if there is a 
mediating intervention. For instance, surrogate markers can constitute “response 
variables”. This is where a surrogate marker is manipulated in order to produce an effect 
that is relevantly similar to the effect with the same manipulation on the clinical endpoint. 
This means that an adequate surrogate must be “tightly correlated” with the true clinical 
endpoint; but it also means that any intervention on a surrogate marker must be tightly 
correlated with the intervention on the true clinical endpoint (Buyse et al. 2000). I 
interpret this as a dual role for a reliable surrogate marker. It is to act as an 
epidemiological marker that represents some clinical endpoint but also to act as a 
responding variable that can be used in an intervention to causally influence the clinical 
endpoint. An example of the dual role of the surrogate marker is that high concentrations 
of LDL cholesterol (LDL-C) correspond to cardiovascular risk (Gofman and Lindgren 
1950). But if a therapeutic interventions is used—such as, 3-hydroxy-3-methylglutaryl 
coenzyme A (HMG CoA) reductase inhibitors (statins)—that intervention can lower LDL 
levels, which in turn reduces cardiovascular disease (LaRosa et al. 2005). 
So far I have presented the representational and intervention-based role of 
biomarkers. It is not straightforward to say that surrogate markers are ‘made’ like an 
effect. But it is also not straightforward to say that surrogate markers constitute a 
measurement outcome that is the final reading on an instrument. These markers provide 
useful representational information in the context of an intervention. To add to the 
complexity of the relation between representation and intervention, biomarkers in the 
context of Alzheimer’s measurement have added methodological steps. In Alzheimer’s 
measurement there are different biomarkers, which are not correlated with each other and 
change with independent dynamics in the progression of Alzheimer’s disease. So each of 
these biomarkers do not provide the same type of representation about the progression of 
Alzheimer’s disease. Furthermore, scientists only understand the disagreement between 
each of these biomarkers in the presence of different interventions.1 The different 
interventions are in the form of drugs (e.g., bapineuzumab and solanezumab) and these 
interventions produce disagreeing representational results for the biomarkers. That is, the 
biomarkers respond differently to different interventions, which is methodologically 
problematic because it indicates that all of these biomarkers cannot be reliably tracking 
Alzheimer’s progression in the same way. Interestingly, scientists systematically compare 
these disagreeing results to make reliable claims about Alzheimer’s progression and 
treatment (Toyn 2015).2 To simplify the method used, scientists track how interventions 																																																								
1 There has been much work recently on clinical biomarkers like: cerebrospinal fluid 
(CSF) tau, which is the primary component of neurofibrillary tangles; CSF 42-amino acid 
amyloid-β (CSF Aβ), which is the protein cleavage product believed to precipitate 
disease by forming neuron-damaging plaques; and amyloid plaques from PET scans. 
While the methodological story is beyond the scope of this discussion, there is a complex 
methodological point that is noteworthy for this discussion (Toyn 2015). 
2 To give a brief picture: The intervention of Bapineuzumab reduces levels of plaque 
assayed by Aβ PET and CSF tau, but not CSF Aβ; but Solanezumab does not alter levels 
change properties of biomarkers and then they compare these amalgamated results with 
how interventions change behavioral/cognitive properties. This type of cross comparison 
allows scientists to eliminate biomarkers that do not track behavioral/cognitive 
improvement.  
The structure of the methodological complexity in biomarker measurement can be 
partitioned as follows: 1) For a particular clinical endpoint, there are limited physical 
representations in the form biomarkers (or surrogate markers) which can be used to make 
representational and perspectival conclusions about the endpoint or risk factors associated 
with it; 2) Scientists intervene in a process from each of the biomarkers in order to track 
the relations between biomarkers and clinical endpoints; and 3) Such interventions 
prompt disagreeing results between the biomarkers, which can 4) be amalgamated by 
researchers into further representations of the relations between biomarkers and their 
clinical endpoints. The above structural breakdown is merely a type of complex 
methodological process that can occur in biomedical measurement. It shows how 
interventions on physical representations (biomarkers) can produce other reliable 
representations. What is important to note about this analysis is the role of intervention in 
mediating further representations. In the case of biomarkers, intervention is necessary to 
test how close biomarkers are in their representations of clinical endpoints and also to 
other biomarkers. These representations not only represent the relation between the 
original biomarker and the clinical endpoint, but they also represent how a given 																																																																																																																																																																					
of plaque assayed by Aβ PET and CSF tau but leads to a reduction in CSF Aβ. Cross 
comparison of the intervention mechanisms allows scientists to begin to make causal 
claims about which biomarkers are more reliable than others (Toyn 2015). 
intervention affects a given biomarker. As such, intervention paves the way for iterations 
of representations.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this discussion, I have analyzed the role of intervention in mediating 
representations by using examples from the biological and biomedical sciences. 
Characterizing intervention as a mediating factor in a larger methodological operation 
provides an important point about scientific practice. Representation and intervention are 
not neatly partitioned into contrasting methodologies. In fact, applied science often 
dictates the complex, and often smeared, philosophical concepts and methodologies. For 
this reason, I am proposing a process view of intervention and representation. This view 
opens up the diversity of relations between representation and intervention in a given 
experimental/measurement practice. While I have emphasized how intervention mediates 
representation, there is more territory to explore about the mediating role of 
representation for intervention.  
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